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Abstract 
Although paying taxes is a key element of a well-functioning society, there is still limited 
understanding as to why people actually pay their taxes. Models emphasizing that taxpayers 
make strategic, financially motivated compliance decisions seemingly assume an overly 
restrictive view of human nature. Law abidance may be more accurately explained by social 
norms, a concept that has gained growing importance as research attempts to understand 
the tax compliance puzzle. This study analyzes the influence of psychic stress generated by 
the possibility of breaking social norms in the tax compliance context. We measure psychic 
stress using heart rate variability (HRV), which captures the psychobiological or neural 
equivalents of psychic stress that may arise from the contemplation of real or imagined 
actions, producing immediate physiologic discomfort. The results of our laboratory 
experiments provide empirical evidence of a positive correlation between psychic stress and 
tax compliance, thus underscoring the importance of moral sentiments for tax compliance. 
We also identify three distinct types of individuals who differ in their levels of psychic stress, 
tax morale, and tax compliance. 
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1. Introduction 
Above the entrance to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are inscribed the 
following words from Oliver Wendell Holmes: “Taxes are what we pay for a 
civilized society.” Taxes are the fuel of civilizations, and few civilizations have 
failed to impose them (Adams, 1993). Yet despite the crucial importance of taxation, 
our understanding of why people pay taxes remains limited (see, e.g., Slemrod, 1992; 
Torgler, 2007; Alm, et al., 2010; Konrad and Qari, 2012). In this article we provide 
physiological evidence of an intrinsic explanation for tax compliance.  
The traditional approach is to focus on the effects of deterrence policies, a 
major component of the economics-of-crime approach (Becker, 1968; Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972). Although this approach has produced many useful insights, it seems 
too narrow a framework for fully understanding tax compliance if it assumes a 
rational individual who maximizes the expected utility of the tax evasion gamble, 
weighing the benefits of successful cheating against the prospect of detection and 
punishment. Using this framework, tax evasion is negatively related to the 
probability of detection and the degree of punishment. Yet, in many countries, the 
level of deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance, and even 
in the least compliant nations, an approach based purely on this standard economic 
theory can only explain observed levels of tax evasion by assuming unrealistic 
preferences like extreme risk aversion (Alm et al., 2010). This implies that tax 
compliance decisions must be influenced by motivations not fully captured by the 
basic economics-of-crime approach.  
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 3 
The inability of the economics-of-crime model to explain compliance is 
probably related to a variety of factors, including social norms and social and 
cognitive dissonance, as theorized in the psychological literature and conceptualized 
on both social and individual levels (Asch, 1952; Festinger, 1957). It has even been 
argued (e.g., Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Alm, McClelland et al., 1992) that social 
norms act as an alternative to law enforcement in motivating individual behavior. 
Investigating these norms may therefore help resolve the puzzle of (high) tax 
compliance. To influence tax payment decisions, social norms must be internalized; 
for example, through moral sentiments that create psychological costs or stress in 
case of norm violation. The (intended) violation of social norms triggers internal 
sanctioning (e.g., moral sentiments like guilt, remorse, or shame), augmenting effects 
of legal and social sanctions such as prosecution, gossip, or ostracism in the case of 
detection (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). Internal sanctions could function by creating 
increased psychic stress (potentially varying across taxpayers according to how much 
the social norm is internalized).  
We study the role of psychic stress in tax compliance decisions using an 
experiment that requires participants to make compliance choices while their heart 
rate variability (HRV) is recorded. HRV is an established correlate to psychic strain 
(Dishman et al. 2000), and hence a physiological marker for psychic stress, capturing 
psychobiological or neural equivalents of psychic strain that arise from the 
contemplation of real or imagined actions (Green and Paxton 2009). It thus allows 
exploration of immediate physiological reactions represented by changes in the heart 
rate during participants‟ decision making. Our use of neuroscientific tools to examine 
the possible impact of psychic stress on tax compliance addresses the valid criticism 
that past research on moral sentiments has failed to reliably measure psychic stress 
(Andreoni et al., 1998). Our work thus has the potential to contribute to a better 
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 4 
biological microfoundation for compliance behavior. In general, inclusion of data 
from brain systems, heart rate, skin resistance, genes, neurons, and neurotransmitters 
can reveal otherwise unobservable aspects of the individual decision-making process. 
For example, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) evidence suggests that 
mandatory (tax-like) transfers to charity lead to neural activation in areas linked to 
reward processing (Harbaugh et al., 2007).  
Noninvasive procedures like HRV are particularly attractive for 
understanding the biological bases of human decisions in a laboratory setting 
(Dulleck et al., 2011). Coricelli et al. (2010), for instance, use skin conductance 
responses (SCR) to explore the link between physiological measures and tax evasion. 
They find that SCR is correlated with self-reported emotional arousal and hedonic 
valence. Specifically, they link an increased SCR before decision making (i.e., higher 
anticipated and anticipatory emotional arousal) to a greater degree of tax evasion. 
Such a result is consistent with the idea that detected evasion creates shame, while in 
our framework the intention to evade taxes induces guilt, which consequently 
reduces the utility of noncompliance and thus the amount of tax evasion.2  
We chose the HRV measurement technique because it is nonintrusive and 
requires only compact equipment, which allows us to design a complex environment 
(i.e., a large variety of settings and interpersonal contexts). Additionally, HRV 
permits observation of a larger group of participants and interactions in the 
laboratory compared to alternatives such as fMRI. Our experiment can therefore 
include a larger sample than is typically possible with fMRI studies.  
   
                                                 
2 Coricelli et al. (2010) also observe that negative feelings are related to a higher fine, and learning 
that photographs of participants would be disseminated increases this effect. This supports their 
explanation that tax compliance is driven by shame, which is increased with greater public 
punishment. They also find that avoiding an audit generates positive feelings, possibly out of relief or 
the joy of higher earnings, which also hints at the importance of external sanctioning mechanisms. 
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 5 
2. Tax compliance and psychic stress 
Erard and Feinstein (1994) describe the role of moral sentiments in tax compliance, 
using a theoretical model that outlines how these sentiments could influence 
decisions. Because our approach is best understood in the light of their theory, we 
summarize their framework as it identifies two central moral sentiments connected to 
tax evasion: shame and guilt. Both have an influence on tax compliance as guilt and 
shame arise from the contemplation of imagined actions. However, guilt is seen to be 
more anticipatory (Turner and Stets, 2005). Erard and Feinstein relate shame to the 
imagination of being caught and punished. In contrast, guilt is felt independently of 
detection; it is exclusively an internal sanctioning mechanism that arises when the 
individual contemplates violating an internal moral norm. In both cases, Erard and 
Feinstein‟s model suggest that it is the mere contemplation of an incorrect 
declaration that generates psychic costs, which produce a desire to reduce this stress 
by reducing evasion.  
We are not able to measure psychic costs directly but they are related to pain 
or negative emotions. The actual pain experienced while contemplating cheating 
behavior serves as a survival signal to demonstrate that corrective behavior is 
required (Churchland 2011). In our case the corrective behavior would be to reduce 
tax evasion. Thus, experienced pain serves as a homeostatic emotion reflecting an 
adverse condition in the body that prompts a behavioral reaction (such as being more 
compliant) to remove or reduce the pain (Craig 2003). Thus, by measuring such a 
body reaction with a physiological HRV marker we can determine whether pain or 
stress is related to the actual final decision (level of tax compliance). According to 
Erard and Feinstein‟s (1994) model, psychic cost has a positive influence on tax 
compliance. In other words, if their model is correct we would observe that a higher 
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level of psychic stress measured during the decision making process (when 
individuals contemplate what to do) would be correlated with a higher level of tax 
compliance (final decision). The theoretical framework of moral sentiments in tax 
compliance decisions is rarely tested; however, survey evidence suggests that the 
anticipated psychic stress associated with tax evasion can serve as a much stronger 
compliance enforcement mechanism than the perceived threat of legal sanctions 
(Grasmick and Bursik, 1990).  
The following introduces Erard and Feinstein‟s theoretical model in order to 
provide an understanding of how psychic costs can be introduced into the standard 
setting. As a starting point, we introduce the common approach taken in the tax 
compliance literature. Agents choose an optimal amount of income to report (Di) 
taking into account the probability that they will be audited and penalized (if audited 
and underreporting is discovered). In our experimental design, we assume a 
proportional tax t and an exogenous audit probability p (i.e., we do not assume 
endogenous audit selection rules like dependence on the amount reported). If the 
individual is audited (which happens with probability p), then her true income Yi will 
be determined and the difference between true tax liability and declared income t(Yi-
Di) will be taxed with a fine multiplier (ft(Yi-Di)). For example, for f=2, participants 
pay a fine equal to the amount they evaded on top of the outstanding tax. The 
following expected utility model describes the decision for a risk-neutral taxpayer: 
 
                                              (1) 
 
 Erard and Feinstein change the expected utility framework, using a 
nonnegative guilt and shame parameter. In their model they modify the previous 
expression by adding guilt in the „not audited‟ state and shame in the „audited‟ state, 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 7 
as the subject contemplating the embarrassment of an audit is subsequently subjected 
to embarrassment of an audit. Both psychic cost terms have the same structure. We 
modify their model by using only one term that we call psychic stress, measuring the 
negative emotions when contemplating tax evasion and therefore before knowing 
whether or not they have been caught. Thus, psychic stress affects the entire outcome 
term in (1).  
 
 
 
     
        
  
 
                                                                 
 
This equation redefines the utility state so that the denominator of the new 
expression becomes larger than one when a taxpayer contemplates underpaying and 
feels guilty about it, diminishing his or her overall utility level. Erard and Feinstein 
assume that taxpayer psychic costs are proportional to the ratio of underpaying t(Yi-
Di) to the true income Yi. Parameter gi also takes into account that the psychic stress 
experienced may vary across taxpayers.  
 The best way to determine whether or not we observe a positive correlation 
between tax compliance and psychic stress is to conduct a laboratory experiment that 
allows measurement of a physiological reaction during the decision process within a 
controlled environment. Thus, contrary to common experimental practice, rather than 
using the laboratory experiment to explore differences between a control and a 
treatment group, the primary aim of our application is to test whether the relationship 
between psychic stress and tax compliance persists when applying different settings 
used in past tax compliance experiments.  
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The main decision process starts when the income declaration screen appears 
and ends when the participants press the okay button (see Figure A1). The pressing 
of the okay button is described as point “0” in Figure 1. The average time it took a 
participant to make a decision once the decision screen came up was 15.61s, the 
standard deviation was 15.72s. 90% of the observations fall in the interval 
[3.41s..43.58s]. The figure also provides information on the waiting time and the 
audit phase after the decision. If the emotional reaction is due to the outcome itself or 
to the anxiety over the resolution of the audit uncertainty, we would expect to 
observe the maximum emotional activation in the interval after the outcome itself 
(waiting phase, see Figure 1). This was not the case. The strongest physiological 
reaction or stress response is observed approximately 17 seconds before the 
participants click the „OK‟ button, which indicates that something is happening 
during the decision making process when subjects are considering which actions to 
take. Thus, this could indicate that contemplating mechanisms trigger stress 
responses although we cannot actually be sure that participants were contemplating 
tax evasion.3 Therefore, we can only report correlations (albeit with a theoretical 
underlying), and not causations. 
In addition, we cannot claim that such psychic stress is equal to moral 
sentiments or psychic costs, but it is not easy to identify alternative reasons; for 
example, it could be that psychic stress during the decision process is linked to the 
excitement of evading taxes. However, if this were the case, the predicted outcome 
would be the opposite, namely a positive correlation between higher excitement 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, due to the risk of bias, we are unable to administer post-round surveys asking 
subjects what they were thinking during the decision process. Hence, the underlying thinking process 
must be treated as a black box.  
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 9 
during the decision period and lower tax compliance. Moreover, it would also be 
unclear why the maximum psychological response is before and not after the actual 
decision was made (e.g., waiting for the deterrence process).  
 
 
Fig. 1. The Timing of the Decision Process 
 
3. HRV analysis 
Much of the literature investigating emotional responses recorded by HRV elicits 
emotions either by confronting participants with emotionally loaded information or 
relying on asking subjects to imagine (think of) certain events which are known to be 
emotionally loaded or to hold emotional connotations for these participants (e.g., 
Gillie et al. 2015, Rockliff et al. 2008). Indeed, the imagination or thinking of certain 
events can work even better than inducing emotions by presenting an emotion-
eliciting film (see Lane et al. 2009 who used both techniques). In essentially all 
studies on HRV, including those above, higher HRV is related to negative emotions. 
Although previously used in experimental economic research (e.g. Falk et al., 
2011; Van Lange et al., 2011; Brandts and Garofalo, 2012), HRV is a measure 
largely outside the economics toolbox.4 Rather, HRV is normally used to identify 
                                                 
4 HRV measures have been employed to study responses to social interactions. For example, Falk et 
al. (2011) evaluated data on 70 subjects, finding that unfair pay (actual share and discrepancy between 
an actual and appropriate share) is correlated with lower HRV (higher stress) and thus with adverse 
effects at the physiological level. Van Lange et al. (2011) further find that introducing an experimental 
protocol measuring heart rate promotes behavioral trust in trust games and reciprocal giving in the 
trustee, possibly because of interpersonal and intrapersonal mechanisms. On the other hand, Brandts 
and Garofalo (2012) are unable to show that HRV has a statistically significant effect on performance. 
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certain medical predispositions (Malik et al., 1996), as well as psychological, 
emotional, and mental processes (McCraty et al., 1995; Crone, Somsen et al., 2004; 
Crone, Bunge et al., 2005; Appelhans and Luecken, 2006; Koelsch et al., 2007; Yang 
et al., 2007).  
HRV reflects information about two major parts of the autonomous nervous 
system (ANS): the sympathetic system, which is responsible for fight-or-flight 
responses, and the parasympathetic system, which is responsible for rest and 
relaxation (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006; Levy and Martin, 1979). Changes in the 
heart rate generated by these two systems occur at different speeds (Appelhans and 
Luecken, 2006); those induced by the sympathetic system are of considerably longer 
duration (maximum effect after more than 5 seconds) than those induced by the 
parasympathetic system (maximum effect after less than 5 seconds) (Levy et al., 
1970). This allows decomposition of the HRV signal into a combination of different 
frequencies with varying relative importance (or spectral power) over time. The 
frequencies mirror the activation of the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems. 
Activity in the sympathetic system is mainly reflected by high spectral power in the 
low frequency band (LF [0.033 - 0.15 Hz]), whereas activity in the parasympathetic 
system is reflected by high spectral power in the high frequency band (HF [0.15 - 0.4 
Hz]) (Malik, 2008).  
Although the LF band can be contaminated by parasympathetic activity, the 
ratio of spectral power in the LF band to that in the HF band can be used as an index 
of sympathovagal balance (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006), which serves as a useful 
indicator of psychic stress. Because individuals can react to mental stress with 
                                                                                                                                          
After exploring how people react to an audience, however, they do observe that, compared with 
female participants, males are strongly influenced by audience gender. In addition, men exhibit a 
significant change in blood pressure rather than HRV in reaction to gender pairing in the decision 
task. 
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increased sympathetic or decreased parasympathetic activity or both, this LF/HF 
ratio is a better measure than using the LF or HF alone (Berntson et al., 1994). Its 
usefulness as an indicator of psychic stress is further supported by evidence that, in 
controlled experimental environments, the sympathetic-to-parasympathetic ratio 
generates indicators of the psychological state (Berntson and Cacioppo, 2008; Seong 
et al., 2004) that correlate with activation in the anterior insular, dorsolateral 
prefrontal, and anterior cingulate cortices during mental activity. Further detail on 
HRV, its measurement and data processing is included in the online appendix. 
 
4. Experimental setting 
4.1 Experimental procedure  
The experiment was conducted over a period of three weeks in April 2009 at the 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. Participants were 
volunteers recruited primarily from first-year economics units using a faculty-wide 
invitation email and an in-lecture advertisement. The experiment was reviewed by 
the Queensland University of Technology Faculty Research Ethics Advisory Board 
which confirmed that it met the requirements of the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research. The computer-based component was programmed 
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). No participant had previous experience with such 
an experiment. Instructions were displayed on screen5 and communication with other 
participants was forbidden during the experiment. Before the experiment began, 
participants were welcomed and received assistance attaching the heart rate monitors 
via three single-use electrodes to the chest, connecting the device to the monitor (see 
online Appendix). Participants were then seated at individual computers.  
                                                 
5 See online Appendix for the introductory screen. 
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The experiment, which lasted approximately 90 minutes, proceeded through a 
number of stages of which the tax compliance stage was the central element. During 
the tax compliance stage, instructions were also read aloud by a native English 
speaker, and three test rounds were carried out before the experiment began in order 
to familiarize participants with the experimental setup. Overall, 14 sessions were 
conducted covering 45 groups of 4 people (a total of 180 participants). 
The first stage of the experiment included a 50 question cognitive skills task 
on which participants were asked to score as many points as possible during the 12 
minutes allocated. This task included logical questions similar to an IQ test. More 
detail and example questions are included in the online appendix.  
The next stage included a risk elicitation task using a multiple price list 
design as popularized by Holt and Laury (2002), which measures risk as the sum of 
the number of safe (left-hand side) choices made (see also online Appendix). This 
method of eliciting risk attitudes has been employed to control for risk attitudes in 
several previous tax compliance experiments (see, e.g., Heinemann and Kocher, 
2013; Cummings et al., 2009). If participants exhibited inconsistencies in the degree 
of risk aversion (i.e., more than one switching point), we excluded their data from the 
respective estimations. Accordingly, 36 participants were excluded.  
The tax compliance framework was designed to replicate a voluntary income 
tax reporting decision (see, e.g., Alm, McClelland et al., 1992; Alm, Jackson et al., 
1992, 1993). Participants received income over 16 rounds, and then had to declare 
their income to an experimental “tax authority” and pay taxes on the declared sum 
(see Figure A1). The after-tax amount went into wealth generation. No tax was paid 
on undeclared income; however, participants faced the possibility of an audit that 
would detect and penalize evasion. The tax rate was 30%, and the audit probability 
was 12.5%. If evasion was detected, evading participants paid the tax on undeclared 
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income plus a penalty equal this amount (fine rate f= 2). These parameters were 
chosen to mirror the relation between tax compliance and the threat of penalties in 
various nations. In most countries, the percentage of individual income tax 
declarations scrutinized in a thorough tax audit is quite small (usually much smaller 
than the 12.5% chosen here) and the penalty for fraudulent evasion seldom exceeds 
the amount of unpaid taxes (Alm, et al., 2010).  
The experiment implemented two sets of eight rounds of tax declaration 
decisions (for a total of 16 income declaration decisions). Participants then filled out 
a post-experimental questionnaire that collected information on demographics, tax 
morale (see later discussion), and health aspects. From this questionnaire, we 
determined that our participants were between 17 and 51 years old (average = 23.28, 
s.d. 5.02) and 56% were female. At the end of the experiment participants were paid 
according to their earnings during the experiment, receiving between AUD $10 and 
AUD $29 (mean = AUD $20) based on their accumulated wealth.6 
 
4.2 Experimental design characteristics 
We use different design elements that are common to tax compliance experiments 
(Torgler, 2002, Alm, 1999). An overview of the different treatments as well as the 
allocation of individuals to different combinations of treatments is provided in Table 
A1. 
 
4.2.1 Public good structure 
4.2.1.1 Traditional public good design structure 
In 40 groups the treatments included a public good. The treatments were structured 
in line with the literature on voluntary public good provision. Specifically, all taxes 
                                                 
6 Conversion rate: AUD $1 = 320 lab$. This information was provided in the instructions.  
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paid by individuals in a group were accumulated into a group fund, which was 
multiplied with a factor (m) and then equally redistributed to group members (see 
“transfer income” on the declaration screen in Fig. A2). The redistribution factor 
corresponds to a fiscal exchange or efficiency parameter in the tax compliance 
literature. We used three different factors: 0 (no public good), 1, and 2 (the fund is 
increased by a multiple of 2 before redistribution). Following an approach typical of 
the tax compliance or public good game (PGG) literature, the main treatment used an 
efficiency-increasing factor of m = 2. Hence, tax payments were multiplied by 2 
before redistribution to individual players, implying a social efficiency gain through 
contributions. The amounts collected via audits, in contrast, were not added to the 
group fund. In the treatments that did not include a public good, participants received 
nothing in return for their tax payments. 
If moral sentiments do not matter, the optimal declared income can be 
derived in a simple expected utility framework. We use the following equation to 
express the expected value to risk-neutral taxpayer i choosing how much income to 
report (cf. Alm et al., 1999): 
 
                                              (3) 
 
where Yi is the income obtained in the experiment before taxation, Di is the amount 
that the individual declares, and       is the sum of taxes generated from the other 
three members of the group. The variable m, is the surplus multiplier as described 
above, s is the individual‟s share of the redistributed amount, p is the probability of 
detection, and f is the fine rate on unpaid taxes. If pf + ms > 1, then the maximization 
of the expected value EVi by given income Di indicates full tax compliance as an 
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optimal strategy. Based on our parameters, however (i.e., p = 0.125, f = 2, m = 0, 1, 
2, and s = 1/4), this condition is not satisfied, indicating that zero income reporting 
would be optimal.  
 The major advantage of applying this experimental structure in the context of 
psychic stress or guilt is the ability to explore the consequences of the transfer 
payment (the amount redistributed). The size of the transfer payment is influenced by 
the fiscal exchange parameter and by the level of cooperation within the group. If 
psychic stress is independent of social influence (the behavior of other players in the 
experiment and the social efficiency of tax payments), any interaction effect between 
psychic stress and the size of the redistributed amount will be insignificant. On the 
other hand, a significant interaction effect will indicate that horizontal (through other 
players and their contributions) and vertical (through the institutional framework and 
fiscal exchange) social interactions influence psychic stress. We analyze this aspect 
in the empirical sections.  
 
4.2.1.2 Variation on the traditional public good design 
In the framework described above, each individual‟s own contribution influences the 
amount redistributed, thus we also introduced a variation in which the group tax fund 
was based on the contribution of the other three group members, which reflects the 
corner case for a very large proportion of taxpayers. Hence, participants‟ own 
contributions did not influence the redistributed sum. This changes equation (3) to 
equation (4) with s=1/3.7 
 
                                         (4) 
                                                 
7 Note that also in this framework (if p<0.5, which is satisfied here) not declaring taxes is optimal for 
a risk neutral taxpayer. 
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Participants went through 8 consecutive rounds of both redistribution 
frameworks described in 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2, comprising a total of 16 periods of tax 
compliance decisions. (The rule used for the first 8 rounds was determined randomly, 
except when there was no redistribution at all.) The compliance rate over the 16 
rounds between the different redistribution factors is graphed in the online Appendix.  
 
4.2.2 Exogenous or endogenous income distribution 
Two further experimental treatments used exogenous versus endogenous income 
distribution. Participants received income at the beginning of each round. In the 
experiments using endogenous income distribution, the income distribution was 
based on individual performance in the cognitive skill test. Within every group of 
four participants, the two with the highest scores in the cognitive skill task received a 
high income of 400 lab$ each, while the two with the lowest scores received an 
income of 200 lab$ each (participants were informed about this allocation at the start 
of the ability test). This income was given in each round but remained the same 
throughout all 16 rounds. In exogenous sessions, the allocation to high and low 
income, which also remained the same for all rounds, was made randomly.  
 
4.3 Heart rate variability measurements 
During the entire experiment, participants‟ ECGs were recorded using a Holter 
Digital ECG recorder (see online Appendix), and from these measurements, an 
average LF/HF ratio was calculated for each income declaration period. During the 
recruitment process, participants were informed that the experiment would include 
the measurement of their heart rate and that they would not be allowed to eat or drink 
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anything except water 90 minutes prior to the experimental session. All sessions 
were held in the afternoon to minimize the effect of daytime variation in heart rate.  
 
 
4.4 Post-experimental survey 
The aim of the post-experimental survey was to collect demographic variables and to 
measure self-reported tax morale so it could be interacted with psychic stress. To this 
end, we include two items whose responses can be used as tax morale proxies. The 
first, and most commonly used (see, e.g., Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler, 2007), 
asks whether cheating on taxes given the chance can always be justified, never be 
justified, or something in between (measured on a 10-point scale with two extreme 
points: 1 = “always justified,” 10 = “never justified”). The second, which is closely 
related to the experimental setting, measures agreement with the statement that taxes 
are something “taken away” from the individual (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly 
disagree). According to previous research, tax morale is influenced by contextual or 
external factors such as institutions or culture (Filippin et al. 2013, Torgler 2007). 
Hence, to improve our analysis of how the role of psychic stress varies under 
different conditions, we used dummy variables for the different tax morale scales in 
the expectation that tax morale may measure something other than psychic stress.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Major findings 
This section reports the results of analyzing the pooled data from the 16 experimental 
periods. Our results indicate that tax compliance over time is significant, with a 
relatively stable rate throughout the experiment (see online Appendix). This stability 
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implies that our experiment is unaffected by the commonly observed phenomenon 
that repetition in public good experiments results in decreased cooperation, a finding 
that has intensified discussion on whether confusion and inexperience are driving 
results (Andreoni, 1995). Whereas average compliance is between 50% and 60% 
throughout the experiment, there is also a large degree of heterogeneity, including 
significant proportions of data at the corners of the decision space (i.e., full evasion 
and full compliance, see online Appendix). We account for this by using tobit 
models capable of handling clumps of data at these two endpoints. We also need to 
account for the panel structure of the data, but, as we are interested in the influence 
on tax compliance of certain individual-specific characteristics, we cannot use 
individual-fixed effects. Rather, we employ group-fixed and time effects and cluster 
standard errors by individual.  
To explore the link between psychological strain and tax compliance, we 
assume the following basic relation: 
 
Complianceit = F[(LF/HF)it; Xit; TDt; GDi]  
 
where Complianceit is the proportion of income declared (ratio of declared to actual 
income). Since timing is crucial in this setting we provide results from two different 
approaches to physiological data matching. Table 1 contains our regression results. 
Firstly, we use the average LF/HF ratio from the moment the income declaration 
screen appears to the moment the participants click the OK button after declaring 
their income (specifications (1) to (3)). Secondly, we use an optimal time window 
(specifications (4) and (5)) based on a maximum likelihood estimation detailed 
further below. We control for several factors (Xit), including the accumulated wealth 
at the time of the decision (Log(wealth)t-1); received back-transfers from 
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redistribution in the previous round (Transfer payment(t-1)), which captures a 
participants‟ experimental history; cognitive skills (Cognitive skills); whether or not 
a participant was audited (Audited(t-1)) or punished in the previous round (Fine(t-1)), 
and the number of times fined during the experiment (Times fined), which takes into 
account potential longer lasting effects. We first report results without these three 
deterrence variables as one could argue that a deterrence experience may add to 
stress, rendering it endogenous (see specification 1).  
 We also control for other individual characteristics identified in the 
literature as driving forces in compliance (see Torgler 2006, 2007), including gender 
(dummy for Female), age, risk aversion, and church attendance (Church attendance: 
1 = once a week or more than once a week, 0 otherwise). Finally, we control for the 
experimental design and group dynamics (group dummies, GDi), and time dynamics 
(time dummies, TDt).  
 Our estimations indicate a positive and statistically significant relation 
between tax compliance and psychic stress during the tax declaration process. For 
specifications (1) and (2), the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, 
while the marginal effect at the mean demonstrates that a one-unit increase in the 
LF/HF ratio parallels an increased tax compliance between 1.0 and 1.9 percentage. 
The LF/HF variable has a standard deviation of 1.68 in (2) which implies a change of 
roughly 0.6 percentage points in tax compliance per standard deviation change in 
LF/HF. Specification (3) incorporates the lagged variable LF/HF(t-1) to account for 
the fact that psychic stress from the former period could influence the current 
decision. The lagged LF/HF value is also statistically significant but only at the 10% 
level. Similarly, in specification (5) the lagged LF/HF value is statistically significant 
at the 10% level, but its effect is substantially smaller than the LF/HF proxy during 
the actual decision process.  
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 In specifications (4) and (5), we implement an alternative LF/HF proxy using 
a different approach to choose the most appropriate time interval. This estimation 
requires a two-step procedure. The first step is a maximum likelihood estimation of a 
reduced form tobit model using a data set containing one-second interval LF/HF 
indicators from the decision period until it was submitted. This approach ensures 
that, when matching the LF/HF ratio to the decision, the model is able to select the 
most appropriate time offset for each individual (see online Appendix for further 
clarification). In the second step we then use the parameters from the first regression 
to construct an adjusted LF/HF proxy, which is used in the second step tobit 
estimations (see specifications (4) and (5)). The average estimated time offset is  
-16.81 seconds, which, as mentioned previously, indicates that (on average) 
participants experienced the strongest impact of psychic stress approximately 17 
seconds before submitting their income declaration. Therefore, this procedure 
provides the best time interval for the maximum correlation of physiological stress 
with tax compliance, with a marginal effect of 12.6 percentage points as shown in 
specification (5). As this proxy has a lower standard deviation (0.66), this equates to 
a 19.1 percentage point increase in tax compliance related to a one standard deviation 
increase in this LF/HF proxy.8 Taken together, the above results provide clear 
evidence that psychic stress is significantly related to tax compliance. Specifically, 
the decision to pay more taxes (and cheat less) is correlated with psychic stress 
during the tax declaration decision9. 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that if there were no sustained effect, the maximum likelihood would render the 
parameter out of bounds for all observations. In other words, if there were no effect, the adjusted 
LF/HF proxy would be zero for all observations (i.e., no “real” effect). One desirable side effect of 
this procedure is that it allows the offset parameter to lie outside the 120-second interval, which, 
because there are no available data, effectively reduces the influence of the LF/HF parameter to zero 
for those individuals. As a result, no LF/HF ratio effect is implied for about 60% of the sample. 
9 324 observations showed HRV data points within the decision time interval that were abnormal. 
These observations were excluded from the analysis for specifications (1) to (3) to reduce noise in the 
estimates. To reduce the impact of outliers, we first excluded faulty recordings by manual inspection 
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Table 1 
Relation between psychic stress and tax compliance.  
 Dependent variable: tax compliance rate 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Independent variables       
Psychic stress 0.025** 0.021** 0.018*  0.282*** 0.227*** 
 (LF/HF)t (2.24) (2.00) (1.87)  (5.00) (4.99) 
 0.019 0.010 0.008  0.126 0.102 
Psychic stress    0.019*   0.126*** 
 (LF/HF)t-1   (1.79)   (3.48) 
   0.009   0.057 
Deterrence       
Audited(t-1)  0.032 0.012  0.077 0.067 
  (0.37) (0.14)  (0.79) (0.68) 
  0.015 0.006  0.034 0.03 
Fine(t-1)  -0.002*** -0.002**  -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (-2.94) (-2.53)  (-2.76) (-2.76) 
  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
Times fined  -0.084** -0.085**  -0.137** -0.135** 
  (-2.08) (-2.10)  (-3.08) (-3.08) 
  -0.039 -0.039  -0.061 -0.060 
Public good       
Transfer payment(t-1) -0.003 -0.003*** -0.003***  -0.002** -0.002** 
 (-3.11) (-3.01) (-3.06)  (-2.23) (-2.08) 
 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
Wealth       
Log(wealth)t-1 -0.630*** -0.687*** -0.682***  -0.991*** -1.027*** 
 (-2.79) (-3.11) (-3.15)  (-4.89) (-5.13) 
 -0.480 -0.317 -0.316  -0.443 -0.459 
Individual characteristics       
Cognitive skills 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.047***  0.050*** 0.051*** 
 (4.25) (4.47) (4.43)  (5.16) (5.34) 
 0.036 0.022 0.022  0.022 0.023 
Age 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036***  0.046*** 0.046*** 
 (3.58) (3.57) (3.70)  (4.81) (4.84) 
 0.028 0.016 0.017  0.020 0.020 
Female 0.365*** 0.330*** 0.330***  0.188** 0.190** 
 (3.44) (3.28) (3.37)  (2.21) (2.25) 
 0.278 0.152 0.153  0.084 0.085 
Church attendance 2.104*** 1.960*** 1.910***  1.441*** 1.449*** 
 (5.91) (6.32) (6.20)  (4.30) (4.19) 
 1.604 0.903 0.885  0.645 0.648 
Risk aversion 0.028 0.034 0.031  0.047** 0.048** 
                                                                                                                                          
and then removed the top and bottom 5% percentiles from this data over the whole sample. However, 
the results remain robust with those 324 observations included. Specifications (4) and (5) were not 
affected by it as they covered a more precise and smaller time interval and the irregularities did not 
affect the results in any way. 
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 (1.10) (1.40) (1.34)  (2.26) (2.34) 
 0.021 0.016 0.015  0.021 0.021 
Group dummies YES YES YES  YES YES 
Time dummies YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1900 1900 1757  2224 2224 
Pseudo R2 0.304 0.321 0.325  0.301 0. 315 
N left-censored obs. 417 417 379  453 453 
N uncensored obs. 895 895 835  1002 1002 
N right-censored obs. 588 588 543  769 769 
Notes: Tobit model with limits at 0 and 1 for the dependent variable: the tax compliance rate as the ratio of 
reported to true income. Standard errors are clustered by individual. Significance levels: *0.05 < p <0.10, 
**0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; coefficient: partial derivative of the latent variable, y*; t-statistics in 
parentheses; marginal effects for the observed variable y in italics. The reduced number of observations once 
the lagged psychic stress proxy is introduced, results from gaps in the heart rate data (e.g., dislocated 
electrodes).  
 
 
With respect to the control variables, women are more compliant than men, and age 
is positively correlated with compliance, although this latter finding should be treated 
with caution because most of our participants were relatively young. Higher 
cognitive skills, a higher level of religiosity and more risk aversion are also 
associated with higher tax compliance, although the coefficient for risk aversion is 
only statistically significant at the 10% level in specifications (3) and (4). Neither 
prior audit, size of the penalty paid, nor number of past fines seems to improve tax 
compliance in the subsequent period. On the contrary, compliance is negatively 
related to both fine proxies. These results, however, cannot be compared to the 
available evidence in the tax compliance literature because the latter focuses 
primarily on fine rate changes and differences in audit probability (Alm, 1999), two 
variables that remained constant in our experimental design. Nevertheless, these 
outcomes are comparable to the results of experimental studies that use similar 
proxies (Torgler and Schaltegger, 2005).  
We also identify a negative relation between tax compliance and accumulated 
wealth, and between tax compliance and redistributed amounts (transfer payments) 
in the previous round, which indicates that compliance within groups is not 
reciprocal. Interestingly, however, this effect is only statistically significant for the 
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redistribution case in which the individual contribution has no impact. When the 
individual contribution matters, the coefficient is no longer statistically significant (t 
= -0.22). We also explore whether psychic stress is influenced by reciprocal 
considerations. Two potential hypotheses related to such a link are that (i) the higher 
the group‟s past compliance level (e.g., in the former period), the higher the moral 
costs of noncompliance and (ii) the higher the fiscal exchange parameter, the more 
money the subjects receive because of multiplier effects. However, our data indicates 
(results not reported here) no change in the influence of psychic stress because of 
these factors, suggesting that psychic stress is internal and not driven by external 
factors. Similarly, the relationship between psychic stress and tax compliance 
appears to be unaffected by whether the income distribution is exogenous or 
endogenous.  
 
 
 
Table 2 
Tax morale and psychic stress. 
 Dependent variable: tax compliance rate 
(6)  (7)  
 Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Independent variables     
Psychic stress (LF/HF)t -0.038 (-1.60) -0.087* (-1.82) 
Tax morale value 2 0.181 (0.43)   
Tax morale value 3 0.038 (0.13)   
Tax morale value 4 0.344 (1.18)   
Tax morale value 5 0.251 (1.00)   
Tax morale value 6 0.582** (2.26)   
Tax morale value 7 -0.014 (-0.05)   
Tax morale value 8 0.385* (1.74)   
Tax morale value 9 0.242 (0.97)   
Tax morale value 10 0.542* (1.87)   
Tax morale value 2 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.170 (0.93)   
Tax morale value 3 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.170*** (3.06)   
Tax morale value 4 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.025 (0.69)   
Tax morale value 5 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.096** (2.33)   
Tax morale value 6 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.046 (1.31)   
Tax morale value 7 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.024 (0.52)   
Tax morale value 8 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.068** (2.24)   
Tax morale value 9 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.079** (2.36)   
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Tax morale value 10 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t 0.069** (2.33)   
2nd tax morale proxy value 2   -0.507*** (-2.83) 
2nd tax morale proxy value 3   -0.550** (-2.51) 
2nd tax morale proxy value 4   -0.379** (-2.03) 
2nd tax morale proxy value 5   -0.230 (-0.88) 
2nd Tax morale value 2 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t   0.109** (2.07) 
2nd Tax morale value 3 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t   0.094 (1.64) 
2nd Tax morale value 4 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t   0.146*** (2.74) 
2nd Tax morale value 5 * Psychic stress (LF/HF)t   0.136** (2.50) 
Group dummies YES  YES  
Time dummies YES  YES  
N 1900  1900  
Pseudo R2 0.348  0.339  
Number of left-censored obs. 417  417  
Number of uncensored obs. 895  895  
Number of right-censored obs. 588  588  
Notes: Tobit model with limits at 0 and 1 for the dependent variable: the tax compliance rate as the 
ratio of reported to true income. Standard errors are clustered by individual. Significance levels: *0.05 
< p < 0.10, **0.01< p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
5.2 Tax Morale and psychic stress 
Next, we explore whether the effect of psychic stress may differ depending on a 
subject‟s tax morale using the two tax morale variables introduced in the last section. 
There could be a non-linear relationship between tax morale and psychic cost as tax 
morale and psychic stress could vary for different types of individuals. The results, 
reported in specifications (6) and (7) of Table 2, indicate that psychic stress has a 
consistently strong and positive influence on tax compliance for subjects with high 
tax morale, an outcome that is robust across the two different tax morale proxies. We 
also note that psychic stress increases compliance for subjects whose tax morale 
values lie in the middle or lower middle range (3 and 5 for proxy 1; 2 for proxy 2). 
Hence, overall, these results indicate that individuals with different levels of tax 
morale respond differently with respect to psychic stress and the corresponding tax 
compliance. More specifically, these results imply that tax compliance due to tax 
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morale may indeed be channeled through the imposition of psychic costs, 
particularly for those who think that tax evasion is morally questionable.10 
 
5.3 Different types of taxpayers 
The interaction effects observed previously and the large number of censored 
observations (particularly when using our alternative LF/HF proxy) indicates that 
there are different types of taxpayers with respect to tax compliance, tax morale, and 
their corresponding emotional reactions. To explore further whether taxpayers differ, 
we apply a K-medians partition11 cluster analysis with absolute-value distance 
          12
 
    as a similarity/dissimilarity measure for continuous data using tax 
compliance, the two tax morale proxies, and the main HRV variable. As indicated in 
Table 3, there seem to be three types of taxpayers: (i) those with lower tax morale 
and tax compliance and a level of psychic stress that ranges between those of the two 
other groups (cluster 1), (ii) those with high tax morale and tax compliance but high 
psychic stress (cluster 2), and (iii) those with high tax morale and tax compliance but 
no psychic stress (cluster 3). Interestingly, both clusters of taxpayer with high tax 
morale have almost exactly the same rate of tax compliance, regardless of whether 
we look at the mean or the median.  
 
Table 3 
Types of taxpayers. 
 
Cluster Percent Tax compliance LF/HF ratio Tax morale proxy 1 Tax morale proxy 2 
1 
 Mean 
39.33 0.416 1.622 4.624 2.690 
                                                 
10 While the results seem to be robust with respect to the measure of tax morale used, we agree with 
the point made by one of the referees that the variation in the estimates indicate also the level of noise 
involved in this analysis,  
11 The k clusters are formed by an iterative process; the medians are computed to represent the group 
centres at each step (i.e., observations are assigned to groups based on closeness).   
12 This examines the absolute differences between coordinates of a pair. i and j define the different 
subjects while k the features or variables (p=number of variables). 
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2 23.09 0.613 3.065 8.708 3.132 
3 37.58 0.617 0.691 8.193 3.027 
  Median 
1 39.33 0.30 1.160 5 2 
2 23.09 0.75 2.453 9 3 
3 37.58 0.75 0.603 8 3 
 
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
As a first robustness check, we conduct separate analyses of the periods with 
different public good redistribution rules. Applying specification (1) indicates that in 
both cases the coefficient (LF/HF)t remains statistically significant. We then check 
whether there is a possible nonlinear relation between psychic costs and tax 
compliance. After adding (LF/HF)t
2 into the two specifications reported in Table 1, 
we observe that the coefficient (LF/HF)t
2 is negative while (LF/HF)t remains positive 
with a t-value of 2.20 (indicating that tax compliance is increasing at a decreasing 
rate with an increase in psychic stress). The coefficient for (LF/HF)t
2, however, is not 
statistically significant (t = -1.53), indicating that the linear parameter is a sufficient 
fit. As further robustness checks, we add controls for HRV-related health factors 
such as alcohol consumption (drinks per week), smoking habits (“daily = 3,” “less 
frequently = 2,” “not at all” = 1) and physical/sport activity (minutes per week). 
These additions, however, barely change the impact of the LF/HF ratio on tax 
compliance (t = 2.03, marginal effect = 0.01)13.  
 
5.5 Psychic stress after noncompliance 
Finally, we examine whether individuals experience psychic stress after committing 
an illegal act (remorse) or after getting caught (shame)14. The feeling of remorse is 
related to what Cooter and Ulen (2004, p. 464) call “Saturday night fever”: waking 
                                                 
13 Regression tables are in the online Appendix.  
14 For detailed results see online Appendix.  
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up the next morning saying, “I can‟t believe what I did last night!” Our results reveal 
a negative but insignificant (t = -0.80) correlation between tax compliance in a 
previous period (t-1) and psychic stress in the current period (t).15 We therefore 
refine the analysis to explore the relation between tax compliance and psychic stress 
measured from the moment the auditing screen appears until the moment the 
participant clicks OK (see Figures 1 and A2). The results indicate that in this case, 
tax compliance is also negatively but insignificantly (t = -1.18) related to psychic 
stress.  
 We also look at the relation between deterrence in the previous period (t-1) 
and psychic stress in the current round (t).16 We find no significant relation between 
psychic stress and being audited (t = -1.15) or the size of the fine (t = -1.10),17 which 
indicates little psychic stress after the individual experiences punishment. Similarly, 
when we examine how psychic stress during the audit screen changes with the 
number of times fined, the correlation is negative (i.e., the more times fined, the less 
the psychic stress), but the coefficient is again not statistically significant (-0.51).18  
   
6 Conclusions 
Our results show that the analysis of tax compliance may benefit from a deeper 
understanding of moral sentiments and its physiological foundation. Contrary to the 
findings of Coricelli et al. (2010) but in line with Erard and Feinstein‟s (1994) 
theoretical framework, we find that higher psychic stress increases tax compliance. 
We therefore hypothesize that this higher psychic stress may be due to an intention 
or contemplation of making a false declaration, meaning that the physiological 
                                                 
15 Based on OLS estimations with group and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by 
individual.  
16 For these estimates, we use the same OLS specification (group and time dummies and clustering).  
17 We explore deterrence using two separate regressions.  
18 The OLS regression is structured as before.  
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measurement could be an indicator of moral sentiments or psychic costs. However, 
future studies could try to manipulate moral sentiments such as guilt or manipulate 
stress to see whether there is a causal relationship.  
Based on additional analyses, we can also classify taxpayers into three types: 
those with high tax morale and tax compliance but no psychic stress, those with high 
tax morale and high tax compliance but high psychic stress, and those with lower tax 
morale and tax compliance and a psychic stress level somewhere between those of 
the other two groups. This suggests an interpretation of our measures of psychic 
stress: they are being triggered by moral emotions, which motivate compliance 
decisions. Future research could explore in more detail the implications of different 
types of taxpayers. There are already attempts in the literature to classify taxpayers 
into different types (Vogel 1974, Torgler 2003).  
Our results may also have implications for research beyond tax compliance, 
such as contributions to the commons (Dietz et al., 2003), which underlie many 
public good activities. However, further research is required to determine if our 
findings on the role of the physiologically measurable psychic costs of moral 
sentiments will hold independent of a specific domain. Furthermore, our results 
could have implications for policy; for example by documenting the importance of 
increasing awareness regarding the value of taxes, particularly with respect to their 
use. In addition, it may increase awareness of the commons more generally, which 
could foster compliance. From this perspective, understanding the social and 
economic conditions under which contribution elicits more or less psychic strain may 
be a way to improve tax compliance and, if results apply more generally, to public 
good frameworks and the effectiveness of public good contribution systems in 
general.  
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Finally, the present study demonstrates that HRV data can be used as a 
biomarker to observe decision behavior influenced by the nonmonetary and 
noneconomic incentives (like norms) underlying contributions to the commons or 
society in general. Not only can such data help to predict and explain participants‟ 
behavior, but carefully designed experiments that record individuals‟ HRV can help 
to shed light on latent processes by offering objective data where subjective 
motivations like moral sentiment and social norms affect decision making. 
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Appendix A. Additional tables and figures 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A1. Distribution of the LF/HF ratio. 
 
 
 
Table A1. Treatments and observations. 
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 Treatments 
Multiplication factor (m) 0 1 2 
Income endogenous exogenous 
Participants 20 64 (28, 36) 68 (28, 40) 28 (16, 12) 
Participants with usable HRV data 19 64 (28, 36) 67 (27, 40) 26 (14, 12) 
Notes: The table shows the tax rate for compliant subjects and the number of participants in each 
treatment. The numbers in brackets specifies the number of participants which first played the 
inclusive (included own contributions) or the exclusive treatment (excluding own contributions) 
(inclusive first, exclusive first). The table also includes the respective number of participants with 
usable HRV measures. The main treatment, to which other treatments are variations for comparison, is 
highlighted in bold. 
 
 
 
Fig. A2. Income tax declaration screen. 
Notes: Because the time data on events in the computer-based experiment are prone to variation 
caused by network traffic issues, the time recorded only gives an indication of when the event actually 
happened (i.e., when the screen with the information was actually visible to the participant). We 
therefore isolated the laboratory network from the university network and assigned it to its own 
subnet, which substantially reduced the recording discrepancy (to <6 milliseconds).  
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 Research Highlights: Dulleck, Fooken, Newton, Ristl, Schaffner, Torgler: Tax Compliance 
and Psychic Costs: Behavioral Experimental Evidence Using a Physiological Marker  
This article presents research that is innovative with respect to the following  
• It uses heart rate variability, an established measure of stress, in a taxation experiment.  
• It adds to the very limited literature providing physiological evidence that moral 
sentiment or social norms (tax moral) matter for peoples’ decision to pay taxes.  
• It presents experimental data indicating that feeling of guilt may explain compliant 
behaviour.  
• It is first to look at heterogeneity among experimental tax payers with respect to 
compliance behavior and physiological reactions.  
